Case 1:18-cv-02099-LGS-KNF Document 32 Filed 04/17/18 Page 1 of 21

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1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 OFF-WHITE LLC, 4 Plaintiff, 5 18 Civ. 2099 (LGS) v. 6 A445995685, et al., 7 Conference 8 Defendants. 9 New York, N.Y. 10 March 22, 2018 12:00 p.m. 11 Before: 12 HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, 13 District Judge 14 **APPEARANCES** 15 EPSTEIN DRANGEL LLP 16 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: MARY C. BRENNAN 17 JASON DRANGEL 18 MAVRONICOLAS & DEE LLP Attorneys for Defendant Trendy_World BY: PETER CARO DEE 19 20 DEWEY PEGNO & KRAMARSKY LLP Attorneys for nonparty ContextLogic 21 BY: DAVID S. PEGNO - and -22 BARNES & THORNBURG LLP BY: DWIGHT D. LUECK (via telephone) 23 ALSO PRESENT: DEVANG SHAH, In-house Counsel Wish.com (via 24 telephone) 25

(In the robing room)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Good morning. Mr. Lueck and Mr. Shah, are you there?

MR. LUECK: We are. Thank you.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield, in Off-White LLC v. A445995685, et al. For the plaintiff, we have Mary Kate Brennan and Jason Drangel. For nonparty, ContextLogic, we have David S. Pegno and Dwight Lueck and Devang Shah. Mr. Lueck and Shah are on the phone. And for Trendy_World, we have Peter Dee.

We can begin. Thank you.

THE COURT: Good morning. Sorry for the delay. I noted that late yesterday there were filings by one of the restrained parties, which is ContextLogic, as well as a response to that opposition. They were filed late, so I haven't had a chance to study them, but I have looked at them.

I think maybe the best way to do is for me to start with ContextLogic. As I understand it, the scope of the preliminary injunction would bar ContextLogic from contributing on the Wish platform goods being sold by any of the defendants and not simply goods of Off-White. Is that essentially what the dispute is about?

MR. LUECK: Yes, your Honor. Dwight Lueck on behalf of ContextLogic. Thank you for allowing us to participate by phone. It's an unusual year when there are more debilitating

blizzards in New York City than in Indiana.

THE COURT: I'll just say, as a Hoosier myself, I know that from personal experience. The weather's been very odd.

Go ahead.

MR. LUECK: Yes, the issue here is focused on Section 1(a) (6) on page 12 of the TRO, which would restrict

ContextLogic and other platform providers from allowing the defendant merchants to offer any products over the platform, including products that in no way infringe on the Off-White rights. We are not before the Court today to challenge any of the other provisions. In fact, there is a provision that requires total freezes of assets, including assets that may have been derived from not infringing sales by the defendant merchants. We are not seeking reconsideration of that point.

We are only seeking reconsideration of the point which would allow all 161 of these merchant stores to be taken down.

Currently, there are approximately 200 live posts, 200 valid live posts on the Wish trading platform of these merchants that do not infringe on the Off-White marks.

THE COURT: Just so I understand that, you mean they're not Off-White products; they're totally unrelated products, is that what you're saying?

MR. LUECK: That's correct, your Honor. Everything from socks to electrical devices to phone cases. It's just a huge range of products.

1	THE COURT: Under other brand names, right?
2	MR. LUECK: Yes, if any brand names at all are used.
3	Most often merchants are not offering branded products. It's
4	just a picture of some stylish socks that do not include the
5	Off-White mark and marketed as socks.
6	THE COURT: Let me interrupt you for a second. Your
7	argument has greater intuitive appeal. I understand Judge
8	Pauley didn't necessarily agree, ultimately, in a case that he
9	had, so perhaps I should hear the other side.
10	MS. BRENNAN: Thank you, your Honor. And I appreciate
11	you mentioning the case before Judge Pauley, because our
12	argument would be very similar in this matter as our reading of
13	ContextLogic's argument. The primary issue that we have here
14	is that without the complete restraint
15	THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you for one second.
16	Was that Mr. Lueck on the phone who was talking just
17	now?
18	MR. LUECK: Yes, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: I just want to make sure you can hear.
20	Can you hear Ms. Brennan?
21	MR. LUECK: Yes.
22	THE COURT: Go ahead.
23	MS. BRENNAN: Without the complete restraint on the
24	user accounts and merchant Wish has that no mechanisms in place

that would prohibit a defendant from just putting up another

posting and then continuing to sell products that infringe Off-White's trademarks. We could just continue to go on, and if that happened, there's nothing that would prevent a defendant from just continuing its counterfeiting activities.

THE COURT: Let me just ask Mr. Lueck about that.

Obviously, if there were a preliminary injunction in place,
your client would be acting under risk of contempt of court if
it allowed further postings of Off-White goods, and so I would
think that you wouldn't want to put your client in that
position if they couldn't abide by the order. So tell me how
you would propose to do that.

MR. LUECK: Your Honor, the trading platform has in place a system that provides the posts will be taken down promptly if parties — if the trading platform is made aware of those. In addition, it has a policy in place concerning suspension and termination of merchants that provides that if a merchant does repost products, there will be sanctions. Those sanctions are not immediately published, but if we were to find that a merchant had, in fact, violated the TRO, that would result in some quick action.

THE COURT: OK. Let me just interrupt. It wouldn't just be they who had violated the TRO. I think it would also be your client that had violated the TRO. So what mechanism do they have in place to ensure that there isn't reposting?

MR. LUECK: The client does screen -- we use the

phrase "screen" -- the defendant's merchant stores to determine whether any product on those stores is allegedly infringing or appears to have allegedly infringed.

THE COURT: What does that mean, "screen"? Does your client have sufficient confidence in the screening that they are willing to be in contempt of court if they don't notice or observe that something has been reposted?

MR. LUECK: Yes, your Honor. At this point we wouldn't concede that we would be in contempt. I think there may be some questions as to that, but if we were, we would certainly be prepared to take the risk of that based on the current screening system that we have in place.

THE COURT: I'll let Ms. Brennan continue.

MS. BRENNAN: Your Honor, I would just draw your attention to the two exhibits which we attached to our letter that we submitted to the Court yesterday in response to ContextLogic, Exhibit B.

THE COURT: Which I don't have. So just go ahead and --

MS. BRENNAN: I have a copy I can provide.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BRENNAN: I'm going in reverse order here, but Exhibit C.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. BRENNAN: You're welcome.

THE COURT: And Exhibit B?

MS. BRENNAN: Yes, your Honor. Exhibit B shows situations as of yesterday and quite late in the afternoon. These are the defendant's — the infringing listings which are identified in both Exhibit C to the complaint and Schedule A to the TRO. In situations where the infringing listing by a defendant is still posted actively on Wish.com, in Exhibit B specifically, you can click through and purchase a product as of late last night.

Exhibit C is a sampling of infringing listings, again, which were identified in both Exhibit C to the complaint and in Schedule A to the TRO. These infringing listings are still available on Wish.com. However, you can see from the screenshots when you go to click through it says "Sold out." We believe this is just as problematic as the active listings because Wish then prompts users, or customers, utilizing Wish.com to go to other sellers who are most likely not defendants in our action and purchase the infringing product through them.

THE COURT: It also suggests that these goods are available at these prices, which I suspect is not good for your client's business model.

MS. BRENNAN: No. Off-White, just a bit of background, is a luxury streetwear designer. It's incredibly popular. Designer Virgil Abloh is written up everywhere. As

submitted in our application, products are sold everywhere, from Barney's to boutiques.

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Lueck about that. I'm looking at Exhibit B and C, which I assume you have since -- actually, they're not online. Are you sure Mr. Lueck has them?

MS. BRENNAN: I believe so.

MR. LUECK: Yes, your Honor, Ms. Brennan provided us with copies of those last evening. And to the extent we have had an opportunity to look into those matters, as to the first exhibit, Exhibit B, there are six postings that are shown there. Those have all been taken down or, because of the time difference between San Francisco and here, are in the process of being taken down, and a rescreening of all of the defendant merchants is going forward.

THE COURT: Wait. Just wait. But that sounds, then, like the TRO was violated and doesn't give me any comfort that your client would be able to screen in order to comply with a preliminary injunction.

MR. LUECK: Your Honor, I have not had an opportunity — or the client has not had an opportunity fully to go back and determine the history for each of these six posts. It appears that they — Ms. Brennan has certainly represented that they're still live. So to the extent that that's the case, we're taking action promptly. So we have not had an opportunity to go back and determine, for example,

whether the posts were taken down, but there's some lag time.

THE COURT: So tell me about the screening process.

MR. LUECK: The screening process applies examinations of use of word marks such as "Off-White" and, to the degree that the technology is present, also will allow for screening of images, to the extent that the same images are being used in a subsequent post. That screening takes place on a regular basis.

THE COURT: Just so I understand, you have some technology that will use digital screenings to screening for words like the word "white" and to screen for specific images; is that what you're saying?

MR. LUECK: Yes. In this instance, just screening for the word "white" would create a lot of false positives, but "Off-White" is being screened for. And, yes, to the extent that that phrase is found to be used, those posts are tagged and examined promptly by screeners and taken down if they're an Off-White product.

THE COURT: I just note there's no hyphen in Off-White in these posts. Are they also screening for "off white" without a hyphen?

MR. LUECK: I cannot immediately speak to that, your Honor, and that is a possible reason for how these posts made it through without being captured.

THE COURT: Well, then it sounds like they could also

perhaps have "off" with two spaces and "white" and it wouldn't be picked up by your screening.

MR. LUECK: I can't speak to that particular issue. I believe there is the ability to screen with a space between. I cannot speak to whether that was exercised in this specific incident without getting facts from people.

THE COURT: Tell me again about the extent of the legitimate, so-called legitimate, postings by the defendants in this case on Wish.

MR. LUECK: Certainly. There are 161 named defendants. In the time that they have engaged in transactions on the Wish trading platform, they have offered a total of \$41 million in product. Over \$38 million of product is not product that in any way is being disputed by Off-White as allegedly infringing on their trademarks. That product, as I indicated earlier, is a wide variety of product, including electrical devices, wearing apparel that in no way has these trademarks, as well as other products. There are currently 200 -- there were at the time the person looked at it, created a number of couple days ago, 200,000 posts from the remaining merchants.

THE COURT: But let me ask Ms. Brennan a question.

Does Off-White sell only clothing?

MS. BRENNAN: They do not. I mean, it is a luxury brand, and you will see from the Exhibit C that it's everything

from socks to hats and beyond, but there are things like phone cases, a pill case. It's a very comprehensive brand. It's not just sweatshirts and T-shirts.

THE COURT: What I hear Mr. Lueck saying is that the breadth of the order would affect them in a negative way because of the extent of the postings by the defendants. Do you want to address that?

MS. BRENNAN: I would, your Honor, and I'd also like to provide you with a copy of the most recent discovery that we received on March 20 from Wish, and I think that this is important. I'll take a step back and say, one, there's a lot of conflicting evidence that we've received from Wish. This is the second set of information. We received the first similar data sheet on March 13, 2018 — and I apologize, I do not have a copy of that today — which shows the first set of data that we received on March 13, 2018. Appears to only cover one infringing listing for each and every defendant, whereas —

THE COURT: I don't even understand what the document is. So just explain it.

MS. BRENNAN: I will do my best, because it's not ours.

THE COURT: Not your document, I understand.

MS. BRENNAN: And we've also had a hard time figuring it out. But I'll draw your attention to where it says "Merchant ID number." That would correspond with the

defendant. Unfortunately, the way the information is provided to us by Wish, we have to go back and put it together, but I don't have that done yet.

THE COURT: OK.

MS. BRENNAN: But then the infringing product ID, which is the first column, it is our understanding that that is an identification of an infringing product that bears one of the Off-White trademarks. A major issue that we just --

THE COURT: What's each separate line?

MS. BRENNAN: We believe each line is an individual infringing product listing.

THE COURT: So these are all separate products, not just sales of the same products?

MS. BRENNAN: That's what we believe. I guess --

THE COURT: Mr. Lueck, can you help us at all?

MR. LUECK: Each of the separate product listings, it is possible that it is the same product being listed over time more than once. Without getting into the product listings themselves, it's difficult to know that, but each is a separate product listing. We call it CIT.

THE COURT: OK. Go ahead.

MS. BRENNAN: Our concern is the information provided by Wish to date is supposed to cover all of the infringing listings. Our evidence shows that in certain cases that has just not happened yet. This evidence that we received most

recently, there are 14 defendants for which on this spreadsheet we've received no information for at all. In addition, there are four defendants which we did receive information from Wish, but that Wish will say there's only one infringing listing; whereas, the evidence, which is Exhibit C to the complaint, clearly shows that that defendant had at least two additional infringing listings. So we're dealing with information that we don't believe to be completely correct at this time.

And our concern, to go back to why we believe it's truly inappropriate for anything short of a complete merchant storefront restraint, is because we don't know, there's some instances where our data shows, the evidence in the screenshots, Exhibit C to the complaint, it's clear there are multiple listings. Here, it's clear there are multiple listings, and we just don't think we have even come close to knowing truly how many listings and product sales for the infringing products that have been offered. We're nowhere close to knowing that at this point, but I think —

THE COURT: What about the impact argument that Mr. Lueck has alluded to?

MS. BRENNAN: I understand that's something that, I think, Judge Pauley in the prior case covered quite clearly that, comparatively, 161 storefronts — and I do want to note that of 161 defendants, we have only one defendant here today to object to anything at all. So percentage—wise on that point

is very, very small.

But to get to your question about the impact, 161 storefronts compared to the hundreds of thousands to millions of storefronts that are available on Wish, it's a very, very minor percentage. And we don't believe that that should cause any undue burden on Wish.

THE COURT: Do we know what the percentage is, Mr. Lueck?

MR. LUECK: I'm sorry. The percentage of what, your Honor?

THE COURT: The defendants at issue here who post on Wish versus the universe of vendors on Wish.

MR. LUECK: I do not have that number before me. I know that there's been \$43 million -- \$42 million of transactions in total over time.

THE COURT: But I don't know how long that is or

42 million out of what? If it's 42 million out of 43-, that's
one thing, but if it's 42 million out of hundreds of millions,
then it's something else.

MR. LUECK: Well, your Honor, I think we're looking at a false comparison here. I know Judge Pauley did this in his analysis. Wish is not the defendant here. Wish is the trading platform, and what we are looking at is an injunction that would potentially shut down 161 merchant stores. The impact on those stores is 100 percent over time of the noninfringing

products that have been offered over 1 million U.S. users that have purchased those products, and one point --

THE COURT: Wait, wait. But you only have standing to talk about your client, and your client is ContextLogic. And it operates the Wish platform, is that right?

MR. LUECK: We come as the party Wish, which is an impacted party, although, ultimately, Ms. Brennan and plaintiffs still bear the burden of establishing that the preliminary injunction is appropriate and that the scope is not a scope that will harm defendants, impacted parties, or the public.

THE COURT: OK. Ms. Brennan, do you want to state your best case for why you've met your burden of proof.

MS. BRENNAN: I mean, I think, your Honor, our comprehensive pleadings and our application, which originally we already asked for the TRO, would be why we'd ask that to be converted into a preliminary injunction order because of the irreparable harm to our client that is caused by the constant and pervasive postings of products that infringe my client Off-White's trademarks.

THE COURT: Can you address the scope issue of the particular paragraph we're talking about.

MS. BRENNAN: Sure, which is -- let me just pull up the paragraph itself, page 12 of the TRO.

THE COURT: And it's paragraph 1(a) (6).

MS. BRENNAN: Which states, "within five days after receiving actual notice of this order, providing service to the defendants, defendants user accounts, and defendants merchant storefronts, including without limitation, continued operation of defendants' user accounts and merchant storefronts." In effect, what we're asking for is the complete restraint on the merchant storefronts and user accounts.

I think that the evidence is very clear that Wish has no mechanism whatsoever — I understand and I hear Mr. Lueck's comments about how they might do a screen, but it's clearly been ineffective. We were told and there were representations to both us individually and to the Court that every single infringing listing of these 161 defendants was removed as of Monday, but as of yesterday, I could go on and buy a counterfeit Off-White product from a variety of defendants, and I think that's a major problem.

THE COURT: Based on what I've heard from the plaintiff and from ContextLogic, I am rejecting the objection of ContextLogic. It seems to me that the plaintiffs have met their burden with respect to the factors that warrant a preliminary injunction, but particularly with respect to the scope of paragraph 1(a)(6), because of very concrete evidence that's just been put before me that this so-called screening by ContextLogic is not effective. And, in fact, ContextLogic, on its Wish platform, has been in violation of the temporary

restraining order in continuing to post infringing Off-White 1 2 products. 3 So, for all those reasons, I will enter an order today 4 granting the preliminary injunction. I would note that there 5 were no other objections by defendants and no other appearances 6 by defendants. 7 MR. DEE: Might I say something? THE COURT: Yes. 8 9 MR. DEE: I do represent one of the individual 10 defendants, Trendy World. THE COURT: Did we know that? 11 12 MR. DEE: Yes, I filed something by email last night. 13 We were not able to file it online on ECF. 14 THE COURT: OK. 15 MR. DEE: That is a spreadsheet there that I filed. It's Exhibit A to this declaration. I'm not sure if you have a 16 17 copy. 18 It literally came in at midnight. MR. DRANGEL: Exactly midnight. 19 MS. BRENNAN:

MR. DEE: I would say 11:59.

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THE COURT: OK. In any event.

MR. DEE: Just speaking on behalf of my client only.

THE COURT: What is your client?

MR. DEE: Trendy_World is one of the merchants on the Wish.com platform.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. DEE: To speak to the overall argument regarding the fact that some new postings have been made, first of all, Trendy World has taken down the one sole product that is alleged to be infringing here, grip socks. Perhaps they sell it for \$80 normally. My client had only made, and it's set forth in the declaration \$600, just over \$600, total on the sales of, I think, about 300 orders. Their total revenue overall during the same time period of those sales was, as set forth in paragraph 5, \$527,000. So the sales of the allegedly infringing socks represent .13 percent of the total revenue during the same time period.

The socks have been taken down. A preliminary injunction preventing the account to go forward would be irreparable Harm on my client's business. So, at the very least, we would seek a carve-out of that particular defendant. I think it -- I'm the only attorney here representing one of the defendants. They're here to -- they're appearing, they're here to defend their rights. Certainly, I think, preventing any of these users, and certainly the defendant that I represent, from operating on the website would go beyond what I think is a narrowly tailored solution to what the plaintiffs --

THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt, and let me hear from Ms. Brennan.

MS. BRENNAN: Sure. I think the most important thing

to point out is -- and we did receive this information very, very late last night -- but based on the data which Wish provided to you, which you have a copy of, as of March 20, 2018, it shows that the product lifetime or total units sold of this one particular infringing Off-White product was 2,153. So, obviously, there's a major discrepancy with what this defendant has put forth. And the total product lifetime value we have at \$5,305.70.

I do want to note that based -- and this is a major discrepancy we have with Wish in general, which I discussed earlier in terms of the evidence, is that we received a prior spreadsheet on March 13, 2018, which showed that the merchant balances are varied. So back on March 13, 2018, the current merchant value for defendant Trendy_World was \$128,010.12.

THE COURT: I'm just going to interrupt.

MS. BRENNAN: Sure.

THE COURT: You really haven't had a chance to respond to this. What I will do is the TRO is in place until today.

MS. BRENNAN: Today.

THE COURT: I think what I should do, the TRO is in place, I am going to enter the restraining order, but I will give both sides leave to put in an additional letter by, let's say, next Wednesday. And try to talk to each other just to figure out what the numbers are, because it doesn't help me very much to have a very small number from here and a very

large number here, and I have no idea what is right, and then if you can, try to work something out. But if you can't, in any event, send me a letter on Wednesday, tell me where you stand. You can do that by filing it on ECF, and I will consider that as an application by your client Trendy --

THE COURT: -- Trendy_World to carve it out of the preliminary injunction, and I will consider it based the letters.

MR. DEE: Thank you.

MR. DEE: Trendy_World.

MS. BRENNAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MS. BRENNAN: Just one, I noticed that you mentioned that we would be able to file next Wednesday on ECF. Do we need — from our end, would you like us to do anything about unsealing the case at this time, because we do believe it would be appropriate to be unsealed now?

THE COURT: You should unseal it at this point. Do you need an unsealing order from me?

MS. BRENNAN: I can prepare one for you and submit it to you.

THE COURT: I also need a form of order for the preliminary injunction to be sent to me in Word, and you should file it on the docket so everybody who's involved can see it.

MS. BRENNAN: OK. I will submit that to you when I

I3MHOFFC return to the office, and as soon as the case is unsealed, I'll be able to ECF that. THE COURT: Great. Thank you. MS. BRENNAN: Thank you, your Honor. (Adjourned)